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Political polarization has been commonly observed in American Politics. Abramowitz 
and Saunders (2005) found that while the majority of Americans are moderate, there are deep 
divisions between Democrats and Republics, driven by activist and elites on both sides. These 
divisions have translated into polarization on political issues between the two parties. Increasing 
trends of polarization have pushed the ideologies of liberals and conservatives further apart in 
recent decades (Hetherington 2009). This split is most evident in certain social issues, which 
have resulted in culture wars in American politics. In this study, I analyze the relationship 
between judicial decision making on the Supreme Court and polarization. I look at both the legal 
model and the attitudinal model of judicial decision making. To find support for the legal model, 
I should expect to see justices that are uninfluenced by their personal preferences while using 
legal arguments to support their decisions. If there is support for the attitudinal model, then I 
should expect to see justices making decisions based on their political preferences. In this study, 
I examine seven landmark Supreme Court cases that deal with the polarized issue of LGBTQ 
rights, and compare the language used by justices in their written opinions. Through a linguistic 
analysis of the opinions, I anticipate observing evidence of polarization in the different languages 
used by justices from different ideological persuasions. 
Research Question 
Does the political polarization that is commonly observed in other American institutions translate 
into an institution like the Supreme Court? 
Literature Review 
Political polarization has been commonly observed in American politics and has drawn 
recent scholarly interest (Layman, Carsey and Horowitz 2006, Poole and Rosenthal 1984, 
Baldassarri and Gelman 2008, Hetherington 2009, Fiorina and Abrams 2008, Baum and 
Groeling 2008, Abramowitz and Saunders 2005). In recent years, trends of polarization have 
appeared to increase in Congress, with Democrats and Republican camps drifting further and 
further apart (Hertherington 2009). Americans appear to be deeply split on many social issues 
that have come to be part of the American culture wars. According to the legal model of judicial 
decision making, decisions handed down by the Supreme Court should be unaffected by these 
trends of polarization. However, recent scholarship finds empirical support against this 
assumption, and questions the role of polarization within the Court. 
 In Putting Polarization in Perspective, Marc Hetherington (2009) touches upon 
polarization trends among elite and mass levels. He uses DW-NOMINATE scores, a common measure 
of ideology created by Poole and Rosenthal to map the ideology of members of Congress. From 
these scores, Hetherington (2009) asserts that clear polarization exists among political elites and 
writes, “The process of partisan polarization in Congress has been occurring over time…Starting 
with the 97th Congress, the parties began to grow apart steadily and sometimes dramatically” 
(p.417). Hetherington (2009) also seeks to identify the origins of current polarization within 
Congress. He argues that these causes can be traced to the 1950s and 1960s when differences 
between parties were relatively small. He attributes the Democratic Party’s embrace of civil 
rights as a key factor that caused white southern conservatives to depart from the party. This 
caused the displacement of conservative southern Democrats with more conservative southern 
Republicans (Hetherington 2009). African Americans receiving the right to vote also caused 
more liberals to be elected to office. Hetherington (2009) also describes changes in the north-east 
as another contributing factor to present day polarization. He describes the northeastern United 
States in the following way: “Although among the most liberal areas in the country, it long had a 
tradition of electing liberal Republicans. As the national image of the Republican party grew 
more conservative, however, these states turned increasingly to liberal Democrats” (Hetherington 
2009 p.421). According to Hetherington (2009), these patterns were reflected in Congress as 
early as the 1980s. He argues that this caused greater differences between parties, but also caused 
the activists within the parties to grow more homogenous. Hetherington (2009) also points out 
that not only have party lines changed regionally, but changes have occurred within both of the 
parties over time, with Republicans becoming increasingly more conservative and Democrats 
becoming more liberal. His explanation for this is that interest groups reinforce polarization 
through monetary contributions that are aimed towards ideological extremes on both sides 
(Hetherington 2009).  
Hetherington’s (2009) analysis provides evidence of polarization within Congress and 
identifies the root causes of polarizations between the two parties. However, it is not yet known 
whether this polarization also applies to the Supreme Court. If it is true that the Court is insulated 
from broader political pressures, then we can expect that the Court will not be plagued by the 
same political polarization seen in Congress, since its general purpose is not to further ideology, 
but rather to interpret the law as it applies to the Constitution.   
Tom Clark (2009) explains why studying polarization on the Supreme Court is important.  
Political controversy over Supreme Court nominations and the steady politicization of 
that process during the latter half of the twentieth century, the deep entrenchment of the 
notion that ideological preferences drive decision making on the Court, and heated 
political battles over the Court’s role in making national policy are just some of the 
reasons why scholars and policy officials alike ought to be interested in the degree of 
ideological polarization on the Court (Clark 2009 p.154). 
 
In addition to providing reasons for why this area of study is important, Clark (2009) also 
assesses different methods that could be used for measuring ideological polarization on the 
Court. Clark (2009) used the Esteban and Ray (1994) measure to track polarization on the Court, 
which looks at both intergroup alienation and intragroup identification. This method allows 
scholars to measure polarization on the Court by assessing both homogeneity and heterogeneity 
among justices, with polarization decreasing with homogeneity and increasing with 
heterogeneity. Clark (2009) also assessed the relationship between ideological polarization and 
fractured decision making on the Court by examining dissents, cases decided during a term with 
at least one dissenting opinion, and cases decided by a one-vote majority. Through this analysis 
he found that there was a larger portion of cases decided with a dissent than cases decided by one 
vote, but both were correlated with polarization. He concludes that “polarization is indeed 
strongly related to (1) the proportion of cases that are decided with dissent, and (2) the 
proportion of cases decided by a one-vote majority” (Clark 2009 p.154). Clark (2009) argues that 
an increase in ideological polarization on the Supreme Court is associated with a Court that has 
an increase in published dissents and one vote majorities.  
 Concurring opinions may also provide insight to the level of polarization on the Supreme 
Court because separate opinion writing reflects different views about interpretation of the law. 
Pamela Corley (2010) has written extensively about the importance of concurring opinions on 
the Court. She builds on the groundbreaking work of Segal and Spaeth (2002) who argue that 
concurring opinions are written by justices who are ideologically closer to the majority opinion 
than justices who have dissented. Corley (2010) studied concurrences by breaking them up into 
five different types; expansive, doctrinal, limiting, reluctant, and emphatic. According to Corley 
(2010), the purpose of an expansive concurrence is to expand the holding of the majority 
opinion. Doctrinal concurrences differ because they offer a different legal reasoning for the 
majority decision. Limiting concurrences attempt to limit the majority opinion, while reluctant 
concurrences express the justice’s desire to explain why they felt compelled to join an opinion 
that they did not want to join. Finally, emphatic concurrences clarify the majority opinion by 
emphasizing part of the Court’s reasoning (Corley 2010). When analyzing these types of 
concurrences with the ideological compatibility of justices, Corley (2010) found that  
ideological compatibility between the justice and the majority opinion writer, 
interacted with the ideological direction of the majority decision, decreases the 
likelihood of a reluctant concurrence; however, this variable has no effect on 
writing or joining an expansive or limiting concurrence (p.33). 
  
According to this finding, the ideology of individual justices only plays a significant role in the 
writing of reluctant occurrences. However, Corley (2010) found that when looking at case-
specific factors, the political importance of the case was correlated with emphatic and expansive 
concurrences, a factor that Unah and Hancock (2006) examined in great detail on their research 
on case salience.  
In their research, Unah and Hancock (2006) explore how ideological preferences affect 
high salience and low salience cases. They argue that the attitudinal model, which explains 
judicial decision making by the personal preference of the justices, can be used to explain 
decisions reached in cases that are high in salience but not in low salience cases. High salience 
cases are defined as cases that involve important issues, which, in turn, attract more attention. 
They looked at civil rights cases in their study and code the salience of the cases by determining 
whether the decision was published on the first page of the New York Times the day after the 
decision (2006). They explained the results of their research in the following way: 
We can state definitively that the effect of ideology in the United States Supreme Court is 
regulated by the salience of the case presented for review. When a case is highly 
politically salient, the attitudinal model predicts an additional 17% increase in the 
probability that the Court would rule liberally, holding other variables constant. We 
believe the reason for this outcome is that case salience references the values of the 
justices more directly by raising their interest and attention in the case to a higher level 
(Unah and Hancock 2006 p.307). 
 
Additionally, Unah and Hancock (2006) found that the attitudinal model was less predictive of 
the outcome of cases with lower salience.  
Thomas Keck (2014) takes a different approach in analyzing the role of ideology in 
judicial decision making by assessing the role of the Court in the modern polarized political 
environment. He does so by focusing on the polarizing issues of abortion, same sex marriage, 
affirmative action, and gun control. Keck (2014) first focuses on how these issues are fought 
through the Court from both the left and the right. He then addresses the role of justices 
themselves on the Court, arguing that  
…judges appear to act more like partisans when the constitutional issue before 
them focuses directly on a key culture war concern and less like partisans when 
called on to police the process by which such culture war concerns will be 
addressed, even if those latter decisions might have a substantial impact on 
ultimate outcomes (Keck 2014 p.140).  
 
Keck (2014) points out that,  
if we expect judges to be nonpartisan umpires, then any non-zero difference 
between the aggregate votes of Democratic and Republican judges would seem to 
indicate a troubling pattern of polarization. But if we expect judges to be partisan 
zealots, then any difference below 100 percent would seem to indicate some 
measure of neutral umpiring (p.148).  
 
When comparing the Court with voters, the two appear to have similar levels of polarization over 
culture war topics. However, when compared to Congress, Keck (2014) finds that the Court 
appears drastically less polarized. “If judges were simply behaving as legislators, their votes 
would diverge along partisan lines far more sharply than they actually do” (Keck 2014, p.148-
149). Keck’s (2014) findings suggest that justices are not as politically neutral as suggested by 
the legal model, but are also not seeking to pursue their own political preferences as suggested 
by the attitudinal model. His argument appears to instead land in the strategic model camp, 
which argues that justices act within legal constraints while having individual policy preferences.  
The alignment of the views of Supreme Court justices and Congress was recognized 
some time ago by Robert Dahl (1957), who explained that the views of the Court are never for 
long out of line with the views of lawmaking majorities because Supreme Court justices are 
regularly appointed to the Court by elected policymakers. According to Dahl (1957), “Presidents 
are not famous for appointing justice’s hostile to their own views on public policy nor could they 
expect to secure confirmation of a man whose stance on key questions was flagrantly at odds 
with that of the dominant majority in the Senate” (p. 284). He notes that throughout the history 
of the Court, a new justice was appointed every twenty-two months, on average. “Thus a 
president can expect to appoint about two new justices during one term in office” (Dahl 1957 p. 
284). Therefore, through the appointment process of the Court, justices are appointed that have 
policy views that align with the current lawmaking majority. If this is the case, then the judicial 
branch will lag behind the dominating policy views found in the legislative and executive 
branch. Under this assumption, the dominating policy views on the Court are never too far 
behind the dominating policy views of the lawmaking majority (Dahl 1957 p. 284). 
There has been a great deal of scholarship written on the role of polarization and ideology 
on the Supreme Court. While Clark (2009) identified polarization by looking at dissents in Court 
decisions, Corley (2010) found the presence of political importance in concurrences. Unah and 
Hancock (2006), instead, chose to look at the role of salience in judicial decision making, and 
found that cases of higher salience were predicted by the attitudinal model. Keck (2014) took yet 
an even different approach, and focused instead on how the Court was used to pursue polarized 
issues, finding that while justices displayed trends of polarization, they did not mirror those of 
Congress. Dahl (1957) argued that the Court is a political body that lags behind the legislative 
and executive branch regarding policy preferences. All of these studies found support for 
polarization on the Court in some way, ultimately rejecting the legal model of judicial decision 
making. 
The research conducted in this study seeks to further inform the discussion regarding the 
presence of polarization on the Court. I intend to add to the existing body of research by studying 
the language used by the Court in LGBTQ cases, to see if there is evidence of polarization across 
ideological lines. In doing so, I hope to add a new perspective of how polarization can be studied 
on the Court. 
Theory Section  
 One view of the Supreme Court is that it is an insulated body unaffected by public 
opinion. Since justices on the Court are granted lifetime appointments by the executive branch 
and do not face reelection, and are arguably not held accountable by the public. Under this view, 
justices on the Court decide on the basis of legal interpretations that may be unpopular amongst 
the public. This view of the Court as an insulated body falls in line with the legal model of 
judicial decision making, which assumes that justices use legal techniques to make decisions on 
cases brought before them. Under this theory, justices are assumed to use the application of legal 
principles, such as stare decisis, and the interpretation of legal texts, to arrive at a decision. The 
model suggests that justices will use legal methods of interpretation, such as textualism or 
originalism to interpret the Constitution. Segal and Spaeth (2002) describe the legal model as the 
belief that “the decisions of the Court are substantially influenced by the facts of the case in light 
of the plain meaning of statutes and the Constitution, the intent of the Framers, and/or precedent” 
(p. 48). The model also suggests that justices are uninfluenced by personal preferences in their 
decisions. Stare decisis is central to the legal model, because justices are expected to pursue 
stability in the law. “The practice of stare decisis is a central assumption of most explanations of 
principles legal choice or the legal model because, if a justice does not practice reliance on the 
holdings of the Court’s past decisions about the Constitution, statutes, and the case law, there is 
little reason to believe that the justice believes in making decisions because of the law” (Brisbin 
1996 p. 1005). This model assumes that justices will follow stare decisis even if it goes against 
their own personal preferences. If I expect to see support for the legal model, I should see 
justices using legal techniques to make their decisions.  
 Another view of the Court is less as a legal institution and more as a political body. As 
earlier mentioned, Dahl suggests that the Court is a political body that is never too far behind the 
dominant policy views of the lawmaking majority. This political view of the Court is featured in 
the attitudinal model. The attitudinal model of judicial decision making identifies the personal 
policy preferences justices hold as the key influence in their decisions. Segal and Spaeth (2002) 
hold these policy preferences as the strongest influence on how a judge will vote on a case. 
Under this theory, it is assumed that justices will disregard legal methods of decision making, 
such as stare decisis, if they do not align with their political preferences. If I expect to see 
support for the attitudinal model on the court, I should see justices disregarding legal techniques 
and voting based off of their policy preferences. 
Methods 
For my methods I began by reviewing relevant literature about the Supreme Court and 
models of judicial decision making. I then chose seven landmark Supreme Court cases that dealt 
with the polarized issue of LGBTQ rights. All of the cases chosen were featured on the front 
page of the New York Times the day after the cases were decided, displaying the salience of the 
cases. These cases were: Bowers v Hardwick (1986), Romer v. Evans (1996), Boy Scouts v Dale 
(2000), Lawrence v Texas (2003), U.S. v Windsor (2013), Hollingsworth v Perry (2013), and 
Obergefell v Hodges (2015). I used Nvivo to code the majority opinions, concurrences, and 
dissents, as well as the Justices who authored each opinion. I used the Supreme Court database to 
determine if Justices who authored opinions were conservative, moderate, or liberal. I then ran 
word frequency tests to make word clouds, including stemmed words, for each ideological group 
to compare the language used by Justices with different political preferences. I also looked at the 
summaries from the word frequency tests to see the number of times different words were used, 
and the weighted percentage of the words in the written opinions. 
Results 
When reviewing the opinions in these cases, I discovered that liberals did not play an 
active role in authoring opinions. The majority of opinions were written by either moderate or 
conservative justices. While liberal justices authored one majority opinion and four dissenting 
opinions, moderate justices authored five majority opinions, one concurring opinion and three 
dissenting opinions. Conservatives authored one majority opinion, one concurring opinion and 
six dissenting opinions. Because of this, there were less data to analyze regarding the language 
that was used by liberal justices. In many of the cases, especially those written by Justice 
Kennedy, liberal justices joined the opinions written by moderates. When looking at the voting 
records of the seven selected cases, the Court voted along ideological lines in all but one case. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013) was the only case in which justices did not vote in ideological 
blocs. However, the key issue of disagreement among the justices in the opinions dealt with 
whether or not there was standing to bring the case, not the issue that addressed the LGBTQ 
community itself. In every other case the votes were divided between the liberal justices and 
conservative justice, with moderates acting as the tiebreakers.  
When looking at the language used in the opinions, liberals, moderates, and conservatives 
all used legal language in high frequencies. “Courts,” “laws”, “states,” “rights,” “constitution,” 
and “case” were among the most commonly used words across all three groups. This suggests  
Figure 1: Frequency of Legal Words Used in Opinions 









Word Count Weighted 
Percentage 
Courts 94 0.93% 473 1.70% 313 1.53% 
States 107 1.06% 490 1.76% 298 1.45% 
Laws 110 1.09% 426 1.53% 280 1.36% 
Rights 133 1.32% 270 0.97% 183 0.89% 
Constitution 55 0.55% 212 0.76% 176 0.86% 
Case 72 0.72% 187 0.67% 97 0.47% 
 
that all three groups referenced legal techniques when authoring their opinions in these cases. 
However, when looking further down the list, the linguistic techniques begin to change by 
ideology. “Protection” and “equal” were used in higher frequencies by moderates than by liberals 
and conservatives. Liberals, on the other hand, referenced “privacy” and “discrimination” in 
higher percentages than moderates and conservatives (the number of times they referenced the 
words were lower due to the lack of opinions written, however, across the opinions that were 
written by liberals they referenced these words in higher percentages). Conservatives referenced 
“tradition” at much higher rates than both liberals and moderates in the opinions they authored  
Figure 2: Frequency of Words Used in Opinions 













Protection 53 0.53% 179 0.64% 117 0.57% 
Equal 13 0.13% 100 0.36% 48 0.23% 
Private 52 0.52% 68 0.25% 37 0.18% 
Tradition 11 0.11% 46 0.17% 70 0.34% 
Discrimination 26 0.26% 41 0.15% 34 0.17% 
Precedent 1 0.01% 37 0.13% 10 0.05% 
 
on LGBTQ cases. These differences in language correlate with the policy preferences of justices. 
When looking at the history of interpretation of the Due Process clause on the Court, it is evident 
that liberals and conservatives have different interpretations of what constitutes a fundamental 
right. Conservatives tend to rely more on tradition and history to determine what is considered 
fundamental. In LGBTQ cases, this translates into the use of Judeo-Christian traditionalism and 
morality arguments to support their assertion against LGBTQ rights as fundamental. Liberals and 
moderates on the other hand, rely much more heavily on ideals of privacy when discussing 
fundamental rights. When reviewing LGBTQ cases, liberals invoke the right to privacy as 
justification for greater protection of rights. The differences in these arguments are reflective of 
the differences in policy preferences between the groups. Additionally, it is important to note that 
when justices used certain language, they were using it in an argument to discredit an opposing 
viewpoint. For example, when conservatives referenced privacy in their dissents, it was often to 
discredit the right to privacy argument that was used by the majority. This distinction provides 
even greater insight into how separated justices viewpoints were based on their political 
preferences. Even when justices from different political groups used similar language, it was 
often only to discredit the arguments made by their more liberal or more conservative colleagues. 
This suggests the presence of polarization, since there was little overlap in the reasoning made by 
different ideological groups. All three groups referenced “precedent” in very low frequencies, 
with liberals only using the word once out of all five of their authored opinions. If the legal 
model was correct in assuming that justices use legal techniques such as stare decisis to make 
their decisions, then precedent should have been referenced in much higher frequencies.  
These different interpretations of what constitutes a right as fundamental under the Due 
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, could be viewed as legal differences amongst 
judges if they were not linked with political preferences. However, since the differences in 
thought are found specifically along ideological lines, this suggests that political preferences play 
a key role in how the justices decided to vote on these cases. 
Conclusion 
 My hypothesis stated that I expected to see support for the attitudinal model through the 
use of polarized language on the court. If I were to find support for the legal model of judicial 
decision making, then I should see justices using legal standards to make their decisions, and that 
they should not be influenced by their personal preferences. If I expected to see support for the 
attitudinal model, then I should see a trend in justices’ judicial decisions based on their political 
preferences. I found that all of the justices used legal arguments to support their decisions, 
however the legal arguments they used were influenced by their ideology. Justices from different 
ideologies all used similar legal words –words like “court,” “right,” “states,” or “Constitution” – 
most frequently. However, despite the similar legal language, justices reached different 
conclusions on the cases. When looking at the ideology of the justices, it is evident that the 
voting record for LGBTQ cases, with one exception, were split along ideological lines in all of 
the cases. If we look past the legal words that were used the most frequently by justices, we 
begin to see polarized language present in the opinions. Words such as “tradition” were used in 
higher frequencies by Conservatives, while words like “private” or “privacy” were used in higher 
frequencies by liberals and moderates. This indicates that justices use legal arguments to support 
decisions made based on their political preferences. This supports the attitudinal model, as 
justices relied on their political preferences to reach decisions on the cases. However, looking at 
the language used in the cases, it is apparent that while justices followed their personal ideology 
in making their decisions, they then wrapped these decisions in legal justifications. The evidence 
presented in this study adds to the growing body of work examining the Court as a political 
body. The results find support for the attitudinal model, and suggest that political polarization 
does indeed translate into an institution like the Supreme Court. This study has been a 
preliminary look into the topic of polarization on the Supreme Court, and there is room for 
further research regarding how language use by justices can be used to find evidence of 
polarization. Further research can explore how this phenomenon occurs across other polarized 
issues that come before the court. 
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